Coercive control in conflict: implications for Syria by Hopkins, Joanne
      
 
1 
 
1 
Coercive Control in Conflict:  
Implications for Syria 
 
Joanne Hopkins1 
 
Today the phone threats start up again in the most awful 
way. I am terrified to be so closely monitored … a sin-
gle nod makes me shut my Facebook account … less 
than fifteen minutes after posting a comment I get a 
phone call from him … all these thoughts make me an 
even more nervous creature. So they will not come into 
contact with my extreme anxiety, I steer clear of my 
friends …1 
 
This quote is from Samar Yazbek and it describes her experience of 
living and working in Syria as a journalist in 2011. The actor exercis-
ing this form of coercive control is not an intimate partner, but an 
agency of the state. Yet this quote could be just as easily attributable 
to many of the descriptions given by survivors of domestic abuse of 
their relationships; where the abusive partners exerts power and con-
trol over the other, dictating how they might live their life, and ensur-
ing subservience through fear. In many cases this abuse is 
psychological, and many victims do not see themselves as such. They 
either normalise this behaviour or simply do not recognise it. The 
violence they experience is intertwined with physical violence: isola-
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tion, degradation, mind-games, micro–regulation, monitoring and 
checking against an unpredictable and ever changing ‘rule book.’2  
Yazbek’s description fits the scenario of someone in a controlling 
relationship with an abusive intimate partner, where the abuse takes 
the form of psychological bullying, which, is recognised as within 
the continuum of violence of domestic abuse. In fact, it is about life 
in Syria.  
 
This paper will explore how the concept of coercive control, 
which has been recognised in UK legislation as a criminal offence 
since 2015 and is currently used exclusively to describe a form of 
abuse within intimate partner relations, can be extended to help us 
understand the continuum of violence experienced by men and wom-
en in the Syrian conflict.  The use of physical violence by the state in 
this conflict is well documented, as well as the state's systematic use 
of torture, imprisonment and rape. However, for post 2015 Syria, 
there is also a need to understand the way that the state and other ac-
tors have employed a strategy of creating an atmosphere of fear 
alongside the physical acts of violence. This fear has formed part of 
the authoritarian regime’s mechanism of rule for decades and has 
been reinforced by the violent suppression of any dissent, but since 
the Syrian conflict erupted it has been used by the regime as a strate-
gy of war. This paper therefore argues that the international can learn 
from the local in this particular context.  
 
The term ‘coercive control’ was developed by Evan Stark in his 
work Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women, first published in 
2007. In December 2015, it became a criminal offence in UK law. 
Coercive control is currently, first and foremost, a ‘domestic’ crime 
in ‘domestic’ legislation. But while Stark developed this concept to 
describe dynamics in intimate partner relationships and he himself is 
skeptical about its wider utility, in his own work, he talks about the 
concept being one of ‘entrapment’ and deprivation of liberty. He also 
compares the experience of coercive control to the experience of 
‘capture crimes’ or of being held hostage and draws parallels with 
the experience of prisoners of war (POWs), both in terms of the be-
haviour itself and the impact it has on the victim. So, within the ex-
isting concept as framed by its creator there are indications of 
synergies between the ‘domestic’ in a non-conflict situation and the 
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behaviours of actors in war and the potential to stretch the definition 
beyond intimate partner violence.  I want to explore the ways in 
which this can be applied to the experiences of those in the current 
Syrian conflict and how this concept can be used to help academics 
and policy makers to improve our understanding of the impact of 
conflict on people who are currently displaced or resettled, but also 
on those seeking to return to Syria in the future to rebuild the coun-
try.  
 
I will begin by setting out my own positionality and placing this 
paper in the context of my ongoing research. This is followed by a 
discussion of Stark's definition of coercive control and the process by 
which it became a criminal offence in the UK. The rational for em-
ploying this concept in the discipline of International Relations is 
emphasized, particularly as a way of improving our understanding of 
the experience of war. The discussion subsequently moves to an ex-
amination of what international law says regarding ‘controlling be-
haviour’ and the sorts of psychological violence that Stark describes 
and the difficulties of interpretation and enforcement. Finally, I apply 
this conceptual framework on the Syrian conflict to illustrate how the 
definition can be stretched, before bringing us back to the domestic 
environment to make a link between the two through the ‘Reclaim 
the Night’ movement.  
 
My primary concern is to explore the impact of the ‘fear’ of 
sexual violence in the Syrian conflict. Here, I share the view of Stark, 
that by focusing on other forms of violence, we are not seeking to 
diminish the importance or deny the fact of physical violence. In-
stead, I intend to make the case that, in both the domestic and inter-
national arenas of conflict, the fear of violence is a specific 
psychological weapon that is being deployed by agents and alongside 
a range of other physical tactics. The fear thus generated in this con-
tinuum of violence is so extreme that it prevents the individual from 
escaping from the relationship they have with their perpetrator and 
therefore they are trapped. This makes the behaviour they experience 
a crime of entrapment or liberty. A question asked of many survivors 
of domestic abuse, and of those claiming asylum, is ‘why did you not 
leave’? The point at which a person can flee from this violence, or 
the reason why they do not, can be entirely understood by the psy-
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chological grip they are trapped in, often unknowingly, and the cul-
mination of years of controlling behaviour which is normalised. The 
point where this becomes intolerable is the point when the survivor 
chooses to leave; often harm against children or other parties pro-
vides the tipping point. The murder of children who had put anti Ba-
shar slogans on the city walls of Daara in March 2011 is widely 
regarded as having acted as a similar catalyst for protest in Syria.  
 
The importance of understanding this element of the continuum 
of violence, is around the impact on liberty and freedom. The genera-
tion of the fear of an act of physical violence may have the same im-
pact on a victim as if the physical act did occur. The effect of this on 
human behaviour, movement and decisions to flee or fight, is im-
portant in understanding what has happened to people in Syria. The 
sociologist Liz Kelly has studied the impact of sexual violence on 
survivors and concluded that a victim’s level of fear derives as much 
from her perception of what could happen based on past experience 
as from the immediate threat of the perpetrator.3 Stark similarly states 
that in coercive control, the idea of physical harm planted in the vic-
tims’ mind can have more devastating effect than actual violence.’4 
 
It also helps to explain what people would need to see happen 
before Syria can be reconstructed and peace built. Miriam Cooke in 
her 2017 book Dancing in Damascus describes meeting a leading 
Syrian intellectual: 
 
Like all Syrians I have met….[he]…is committed to im-
agining a new political system that will give each indi-
vidual freedom, dignity and a clear understanding of 
what it means to be a real citizen.5 
 
Compare this to what a domestic abuse survivor says when ques-
tioned about what she wanted from her future: “A future free from 
fear, not having to look over my shoulder all the time, to be mentally 
and financially independent but most of all to stop feeling ashamed 
of who I am.”6 In understanding what is needed to support this ambi-
tion, there is scope to put in place the structures and strategies that 
allow this to be realised. What can be learnt from the domestic expe-
rience to help us to do this in a future Syria? 
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The objective here is to demonstrate how coercive control is 
used to achieve the same outcomes as physical violence in conflict: 
sectarian violence, displacement of certain peoples and the restora-
tion of authoritarianism in the face of uprising. And therefore, show 
how the psychological violence in conflict is like coercive control in 
that it is part of the weaponry at the disposal of the perpetrator, 
whether that is a husband or a boyfriend or an agent of the state or 
non-state actor, the outcome is the same. They achieve domination 
and control.  The victim does what the perpetrator intends.  
 
My academic pursuits are only part of my ‘position’. In addition 
to being a PhD student, I am a Senior Civil Servant in the Home Of-
fice in the UK and I have 17 years’ experience of work in Immigra-
tion, Crime and Policing. Of relevance to this work, I was 
responsible for the UK Government’s 2010 strategy to end violence 
against women and girls and have recently supporting the work to 
resettle Syrian families in the UK as well as broader priorities around 
asylum support and integration. I am now Director of the Adverse 
Childhood Experiences Hub in Wales looking at how we support 
organisations to understand the impact of trauma in childhood and 
increase awareness of how to prevent it. 
 
A better understanding of the different experiences of violence 
in war will support the development of academic research and pro-
vide some challenge to existing literature about how ‘psychological’ 
violence and the provocation of an emotional response has a place in 
International Relations (IR). This work will also contribute to a new 
developing strand of research in feminist IR that considers emotion 
and war. By including the voices of artists, authors and poets, I hope 
to demonstrate the importance of their work in helping us to under-
stand what it feels like to experience conflict, and to push against the 
perception that fiction, for example, can be a source for IR theorists 
to examine. I hope that my research will also support those of us 
working on UK government policies to better support the integration 
of Refugees from conflict zones, in this case Syria. It will help us to 
ensure the right ‘domestic’ services are available to those who want 
or need them, but also build on our improved understanding of how 
coercive control impacts on people in the domestic sphere to support 
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those we seek to help be part of our society. Drawing out the paral-
lels of what the victims and survivors experience, may help us to do 
so.  
 
So, what exactly is ‘Coercive Control’? According to Stark, it 
may be defined as follows:  
 
… an ongoing pattern of domination by which male 
abusive partners primarily interweave repeated physical 
and sexual violence with intimidation, sexual degrada-
tion, isolation and control. The primary outcome of co-
ercive control is a condition of entrapment that can be 
hostage-like in the harms it inflicts on dignity, liberty, 
autonomy and personhood as well as to physical and 
psychological integrity.7 
 
An important aspect of coercive control is its gendered nature. Stark 
is clear that coercive control is gendered because: 
 
… it is used to secure male privilege, and its regime of 
domination/subordination is constructed around the en-
forcement of stereotypes. ‘Domination’ here refers to 
both the power/privilege exerted through coercive con-
trol in individual relations and to the political power 
created when men as a group use their oppressive tactics 
to reinforce persistent sexual inequalities in the larger 
society.8 
 
In 2015, eight years after his work on coercive control was pub-
lished, Stark was appointed as an expert advisor to the UK Govern-
ment as it decided to make coercive control a criminal offence. This 
represented a fundamental shift in UK policy. In 2010, the publica-
tion of the strategy to end violence against women and girls in the 
UK was celebrated by the leading organisations which campaign for 
the rights of women, victims and survivors of domestic abuse, for 
bringing together all forms of gender-based violence in a single strat-
egy; something they had been demanding for 30 years. Significantly, 
this strategy barely mentions coercive control. This situation has 
changed over the preceding years, and changes of government. And 
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as the focus changed to become more criminal justice orientated, 
there was a move by the sector to push for a specific offence to rec-
ognise coercive control as a form of violence within the continuum 
of violence in the domestic space. It recognises the harm caused by 
coercion or control, and that the cumulative impact on the victim and 
a repeated pattern of abuse can be more injurious and harmful than a 
single incident of violence.9 This is an important context to under-
stand for this paper, as although the UK government has recognised 
domestic violence and all forms of violence against women and girls 
for many years, the criminal offence of coercive control is relatively 
new and somewhat controversial. The difficulty prosecutors and the 
police face in getting convictions for this form of violence even 
where there is physical evidence has brought into question whether 
convictions could be secured for something that is even more diffi-
cult to ‘prove’. Despite this concern, however, what the offence has 
done is helped highlight the fact that abuse is not just a physical at-
tack, and the impact of these other forms of violence are part of the 
whole picture of abuse. If we understand this, we can provide the 
right support. This is a similar situation to the international setting, 
where it is clearly difficult to get justice at the state level for physical 
acts of violence let alone psychological. Nevertheless, it can and 
should be done.  
 
In December 2015, the new offence came into force in the UK. 
The accompanying statutory guidance provides the UK cross-
government definition on which the offence is based as:  
 
Controlling behaviour is: a range of acts designed to 
make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolat-
ing them from sources of support, exploiting their re-
sources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them 
of the means needed for independence, resistance and 
escape and regulating their everyday behaviour.   
 
Coercive behaviour is: a continuing act or a pattern of 
acts of assault, threats, humiliation and intimidation or 
other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten their 
victim.10 
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Taken on its own, without an accompanying explanation around 
this being in the context of ‘intimate partner’ violence or what we 
understand as the domestic setting, it seems as though that this defi-
nition could also describe the experience of those living in the shad-
ow of the shabbiha or secret police in Syria, as described by Yazbek 
at the start of this paper (further explored below). The statutory guid-
ance also sets out a set of ‘behaviours’ that one might expect to see 
demonstrated in a case of coercive control.  
 
Types of Behaviour 
 
The types of behaviour associated with coercion or control may or may not constitute a criminal offence in 
their own right. It is important to remember that the presence of controlling or coercive behaviour does not 
mean that no other offence has been committed or cannot be charged. However, the perpetrator may limit 
space for action and exhibit a story of ownership and entitlement over the victim. Such behaviours might 
include:    
• isolating a person from their friends and family;  
• depriving them of their basic needs;  
• monitoring their time;  
• monitoring a person via online communication tools or using spyware; 
• taking control over aspects of their everyday life, such as where they can go, who they can see, what 
to wear and when they can sleep;  
• depriving them of access to support services, such as specialist support or medical services;  
• repeatedly putting them down such as telling them they are worthless; 
• enforcing rules and activity which humiliate, degrade or dehumanise the victim;  
• forcing the victim to take part in criminal activity such as shoplifting, neglect or abuse of children to 
encourage self-blame and prevent disclosure to authorities;  
• financial abuse including control of finances, such as only allowing a person a punitive allowance;  
• threats to hurt or kill;  
• threats to a child;  
• threats to reveal or publish private information (e.g. threatening to ‘out’ someone).  
• assault;  
• criminal damage (such as destruction of household goods);  
• rape;  
• preventing a person from having access to transport or from working 
This is not an exhaustive list. 
Figure 1. 
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Coercive Control and ‘capture crimes’ – there is already a link 
One of the central positions of the concept of coercive control is its 
clearly articulated link to other capture or ‘liberty crimes’ where a 
person experiences a deprivation of his/her liberty, such as those de-
tained as hostages, prisoners of war and torture victims. Stark argues 
that coercive control resembles the violence used in capture crimes in 
three main ways: it is designed to punish, hurt or control a victim; its 
effects are cumulative rather than incident specific; and it frequently 
results in severe injury or death.11 From the perspective of a victim of 
coercive control, Linda Gordon describes her ‘capture’ as being a 
‘battered woman’s socially constructed inability to escape.’12 Or that 
it is the ‘victim’s agency that is the principal target.’13 The whole 
idea of coercive control is to create an environment similar to that 
experienced by prisoners of war, but instead of a generic conformity 
to authority as might be expected from a hostage, prisoners or those 
detained under the mental health act, it is destined to enforce a per-
son’s obedience, where an individual exerts power that forces anoth-
er to conform to what they want them to do.14  
 
The World Organisation Against Torture draws a parallel be-
tween the context of a victim of torture by a state official, and a do-
mestic victim of coercive control. The torture by a state official 
typically takes place when the victim is in incommunicado detention, 
at the unsupervised mercy of his interrogators or captors and without 
access to the outside world. Battered women, because of their domes-
tic situation live isolated of family and friends and others who might 
support them. 15Victims of coercive control are effectively ‘hostages 
at home’ suggesting abuse is a political crime like terrorism.16 In his 
work, Stark also considers the terms used by other sociologists to try 
to categorise this sort of violence. They are an interesting mix of 
words that bring together the ‘domestic’ and what we might term 
more ‘international’ phraseology, particularly in the current uses of 
the word. Stark describes how we have moved, in the domestic 
sphere, from an emphasis on ‘repeated assault’ to an understanding 
that abuse is a continuous process that includes structural elements 
and has cumulative effects. He gives an example of this work in the 
shift made by sociologist Michael Johnson, who in recognition of 
this relationship, renamed his categories of violence to ‘situational 
violence’ and ‘intimate terrorism.’17 
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This signals not only a shift to the structural understanding, but 
also an example of how definitional stretching can be achieved; and a 
clear link to what we are seeing in modern conflicts such as Syria 
where there are many actors ranging from the state, to individual mil-
itary leaders, opposition fighters and actors such as Daesh (whom we 
would term commonly as terrorists). The distinction between ‘situa-
tional violence’ i.e. conflict where violence is used, and intimate ter-
rorism is helpful as it brings into scope the possibility of discussing 
the coercive and controlling tactics used that are not covered by 
‘fighting’ for example.  
 
I had the privilege to spend some time with Stark during his re-
cent visit to the UK and took the opportunity to ask him directly what 
he thought about the concept of definitional stretching to include the 
behaviour of actors in conflict, particularly around the threat of sexu-
al violence. His response was cautious, but he did offer, in a similar 
way to the shift that is mentioned by Michael Johnson, that perhaps 
what I was describing was ‘sexual terrorism.’ Where he thought there 
was a difference, however, was in the impact on and coping strate-
gies employed by victims. In his view, refugees are more resilient, 
and their main concern is not whether they themselves will be as-
saulted but rather with keeping their children safe from the ‘situa-
tional’ violence and finding a way to make new lives for them.  
 
This is not a mistaken conclusion; but Stark admits to not hav-
ing interviewed asylum seekers or refugees; I would suggest that this 
assumption is based on what others have related to him. Having in-
terviewed many people in this situation, I have observed that they 
will say to officials that the safety and education of their children is 
the most important aspect for them; but they are often hiding the im-
pact their experience has had on their own health or their own needs. 
It is often further down the line, when safety and education is se-
cured, that the wider impact of their experience is realised. And even 
then, through reasons of fear, or from the normalising of their experi-
ence, they are unable to articulate what has happened to them. For 
example, the inherent fear and distrust of authority, is a barrier to 
discussing anything that may appear critical of their political experi-
ence for fear of informants. So much so that often refugees prefer to 
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use Arabic speaking, rather than Syrian, translators. Also, it may only 
be after living outside of the geographical region and having an expe-
rience of different societal or cultural norms that refugees from Syria 
realise that behaviour that they have taken for granted is not ‘nor-
mal’. The impact of this realisation may manifest in mental health or 
behavioural problems which carry a stigma in all societies; the chal-
lenges of asking for this help already exists and to link cause and ef-
fect perhaps years later.  
 
I asked the same question about the potential for definitional 
stretch relating to coercive control of Gill Hague, at Bristol Universi-
ty, who set up the Violence Against Women Research Group. She 
saw scope in looking at definitional stretching, but urged caution, 
stating that we should be looking at this in ‘baby-steps’. The time it 
has taken to get an understanding of coercive control, and what it 
means in a very limited number of Western schools of thought will 
mean that the challenge of broadening it may be a step too far too 
quickly. She felt that there was much more to do to improve under-
standing of Violence Against Women and also felt that it may not be 
the right time to introduce something else into the conversation. Alt-
hough her concern was more from an activist point of view rather 
than whether this is something that should be looked at academically, 
which she supported. Nazand Begikhani, who is an expert of vio-
lence against women in Kurdish Iraq, signaled that she thought that 
this type of violence (psychological, mental) was already in interna-
tional law, and that it had been recognised at an international level. 
She was unsure what more was required.  
 
There has been some work in recent years that does already 
make the connection between ‘negative experiences’ and the impact 
on children, that does explore the impact of psychological violence. 
In Wales and Scotland, there has been more of a public health focus 
on ‘adverse childhood experiences’ (ACES). By framing the issue of 
the impact of negative experience, whether that be of conflict and 
living in a war zone and all that is witnessed there, as a health issue 
there is scope to explore the psychological impact of coercively con-
trolling behaviours in conflict as part of the wider understanding of 
conflict. Public Health Wales recently published ‘Preventing Vio-
lence, Promoting Peace – A policy tool kit for addressing interper-
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sonal, collective and extremist violence’. The report talks about the 
impact of distinct forms of violence but also introduces the concept 
of ‘life course’ violence: 
 
‘Acute impacts of violence (i.e. in the immediate aftermath of victim-
isation) include significant physical injury, disability and death. 
Globally, interpersonal and collective violence are estimated to have 
caused around 580,000 deaths and more than 33 million years of 
healthy life lost in 2015. From a life course perspective, violence and 
other adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) can impair social and 
emotional development, limit individuals’ life opportunities and re-
sult in early death …’18 
 
There is clearly an interest and scope to include coercive control 
in conflict as a form of violence, and ACE, that could fall into further 
research in the public health space. This is also supported by the re-
port by Save the Children in its 2017 report ‘Invisible Wounds’ 
where the impact of the experience of war manifests itself as ‘toxic 
stress. These experiences include the daily fear of death in conflict 
but also the impact of witnessing and experiencing a combination of 
things such as loss of education or feelings of grief. At six years old, 
this is the only life many of these children have experienced,  
 
I will now turn to the question posed by Dr Begikhani; what is 
there in International Law and international statutes and conventions 
that supports the assertion that coercive control, or at least recognised 
elements of it, are already ‘offences’?  
 
What does International Law state? 
In seeking to understand the extent to which the ideas contained 
within coercive control are already incorporated within international 
law, it is useful to start with the Geneva Convention, particularly the 
fourth Convention (1949) which includes: 
 
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all 
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; 
(b) taking of hostages 
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating 
and degrading treatment 
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Although the Convention references torture and degrading treatment, 
it is not explicit that this should include coercive control. In many 
cases the victim does not see themselves as such, until it is too late 
and other forms of physical violence have caused physical harm or 
even death. If a behaviour is not yet recognised for the harm it caus-
es, then it is unlikely to be picked up in such a broad definition. For 
example, in domestic legislation the reason it is an explicit offence is 
to ensure that we understand that this behaviour is not acceptable. 
Without it, it is unclear whether it would be considered and what 
threshold would need to be reached.   
 
For more recent developments, I have looked in detail at the ‘In-
ternational Protocol on the Documentation and investigation of Sex-
ual Violence in Conflict’, which came out of the 2014 Global 
Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict. The Protocol itself in-
cludes reference to the psychological repercussions of sexual vio-
lence for survivors and witnesses, and a reference to the gender-
based nature of it and the prevalence against children. Similar to the 
argument that Stark makes about the structural nature of coercive 
control, the protocol makes clear that “historical and structural ine-
qualities that exist between men and women, and the different forms 
of gender-based discrimination that women are subjected to all over 
the world, contribute to the women and girls being disproportionately 
affected by sexual violence in conflict setting.”19 The protocol help-
fully goes on to recognise that sexual violence as a crime under in-
ternational law is often committed as part of a broad pattern of 
violations against individuals and communities, that includes sexual 
and non-sexual crimes.20 So here we have a recognition, in addition 
to what we know is a crime under international law, that there is a 
broader set of ‘behaviours’ that seem to reflect at least in part the 
definition of coercive control as an ‘ongoing pattern’. What needs to 
be explored further, however, is what is included in this list of ‘viola-
tions’, and how does it compare to the language used in the coercive 
control descriptions and types of behaviour. 
 
 The protocol is cautious when discussing what may already be 
in statute and states that in certain circumstances, sexual violence 
constitutes a crime under international law; a war crime, a crime 
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against humanity and /or an act of genocide and can be investigated 
and prosecuted at both the national and international levels. There-
fore, we need to look at the interpretation of international law and 
how it is enforced to see where these circumstances are, and where in 
these ‘crimes’ there is scope to include the ‘broader pattern.’ First 
there is the context of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) and ad hoc tribunals. This was then codified and 
advanced in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), and then advanced again by the Special Court for Sierra Leo-
ne (SCSL).  
 
 The protocol makes clear that although it has a focus on the 
provisions set out in the Rome Statute, many of them have not yet 
been litigated or resolved. It points out that jurisprudence of the ad 
hoc and hybrid tribunals, such as the Extraordinary Chambers of the 
Courts of Cambodia and the SCSL may provide the only available 
guidance.21 However, what is of interest here is whether there is any-
thing in existing international law that reflects the coercive control 
concept, so the Rome statute seems a sensible place to start. If we 
consider what is contained under the heading of War Crimes (article 
8.2), Crimes Against Humanity (Article 7) and Genocide (article 6) 
there are some elements that may be useful. Under Article 8.2 (B and 
c), there is specific reference to ‘Committing outrages upon personal 
dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment’ in 8.2 (c-
e) there is also ‘Violence to life and person, in particular murder of 
all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture, and intentional star-
vation and deprivation of objects indispensable to survival.’ Crimes 
against humanity (Article 7) lists four areas of specific interest: Im-
prisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation 
of fundamental rules of international law, torture, and enforced dis-
appearance of persons and ‘other inhumane acts of a similar charac-
ter intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or 
to mental or physical health.’22  
 
A thorough examination of the details of the Rome Statute and 
its interpretation are outside the scope of this study. An examination 
of interpretation of guidelines, however, is needed to determine 
where there may be opportunities to use this legislation to include 
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psychological violence.  At a high level, it appears that there is refer-
ence to the sorts of behaviours that are synonymous with some of 
those identified in domestic legislation. What is important about the 
Rome Statute is that it covers individuals acting within the state, not 
just the state itself. And, crimes against humanity can apply in the 
absence of a formal conflict. But initial work of the ICC, established 
by the Rome Statute has shown that it is easier to prosecute under 
some categories than it is others, for example, in terms of the evi-
dence that might be available and whether the acts committed were 
behind closed doors or a mass publicly witnessed atrocity classified 
as genocide. In the case of the more public events it is still difficult, 
but perhaps less difficult to prosecute them for the activity that takes 
place out of the public space. The evidence point is helpful; and one 
faced in the enforcement of the domestic legislation on coercive con-
trol. But there are instances where victims of this form of abuse have 
been able to provide evidence, most famously on one of Stark’s cas-
es, keeping a notebook of daily tasks, which was compelling evi-
dence of the domination and control that the victim was being 
subjected to. But leaving the difficulty of evidencing the crime to one 
side for the moment, it is instructive to return to the argument put 
forward by the World Organisation Against Torture. Because in our 
attempt to find something applicable in international law, it is im-
portant to consider what the Rome statute gives us in terms of tor-
ture, even if trying to prosecute for this may be a more difficult route.  
 
 The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cru-
el, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) defines 
torture as: 
 
For the purposes of this Convention, the term “torture” 
means any act by which severe pain or suffering, wheth-
er physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a per-
son for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third 
person information or a confession, punishing him for 
an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected 
of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or 
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination 
of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by 
or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquies-
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cence of a public official or other person acting in an of-
ficial capacity. It does not include pain or suffering aris-
ing only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful 
sanctions.23 
 
What is interesting about this definition is that it clearly identifies 
that perpetrators of torture are either a public official or conducting 
their activity with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
someone acting in that capacity. That would not necessarily cover the 
range of actors in conflict who may be perpetrators of behaviour that 
an international definition of coercive control might apply to. For 
example, in the Syrian conflict it would cover the state actors and 
secret police and the tactics they employ; it would not pick up those 
labelled ‘rebels’ or actors such as Daesh, or indeed groups or gangs 
who do not wear any identifying insignia. Turning again to the Rome 
Statute, the definition of torture in Article 7.2(e) says: 
 
“Torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain 
or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person 
in the custody or under the control of the accused; ex-
cept that torture shall not include pain or suffering aris-
ing only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful 
sanctions;24 
 
This seems to provide a more encompassing definition that may be 
helpful to try to make a comparison on the behaviours listed in do-
mestic legislation. However, to be able to take any action under Arti-
cle 7 or where torture is listed as a war crime of genocide, the 
perpetrator must be a national of a state party to the Rome Statute, 
the alleged crime took place on the territory of a state party, or a situ-
ation is referred to the court by the United Nations Security Council. 
In the case of Syria, it seems very unlikely that this would happen 
under any route.  
 
 International law at the moment does recognise, at a high level, 
the impact of psychological torture and whilst this is helpful, what it 
does not do is recognise the cumulative effect of controlling or coer-
cive behaviour or provide clarity to those who enforce it, as to what 
behaviours constitute an offence. The testing of the existing law is 
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essential to understanding what is needed, and it is still easier to do 
this through publicly witnessed acts of physical violence.  
 
Coercive Control in the Syrian Conflict 
The conflict in Syria provides a very current example of an interna-
tional application for the concept of coercive control. Stark describes 
coercive control as being so extensive and penetrating that there is a 
sense of ‘omnipresence.’25 He also refers to the ‘injection of high 
levels of fear into the ordinary round of everyday life’26 and the dev-
astating psychological effects of isolation; the incapacity to ‘not 
know what you know’ or what he terms as ‘perspecticide’27 where 
the perspective of what is right or wrong is taken away. All this is 
recognisable in the documented experiences of Syrians as the Arab 
Spring took place in 2011, and the country descended into war. But 
elements of it can also be found prior to that.  
 
Three examples of literature that illustrate these very aspects in 
relation to Syria are examined here. The first example is the work of 
Nihad Sirees who describes in his ‘semi fictional’ book ‘The Silence 
and the Roar’ the sense of an ‘all seeing’ omnipresent government, 
which forces all citizens to carry identification and does spot checks, 
and coerces the people (described as masses) to take part in marches 
to celebrate their leader. He describes in detail the sense of fear and 
his isolation as a journalist. His experience at the hands of the secret 
police, whom he describes as ‘military security goons’, and the time 
he spends dodging them, demonstrates the power that they wield. 
Power in this case is created by the threat of physical violence if he 
failed to comply with their demands to work for them in the propa-
ganda machine. He does not experience any physical violence until 
later in the book, but his understanding that physical violence will be 
a consequence of an arrest is clear. He describes the actions of the 
secret police towards a man in charge of the photocopying of posters 
of the leader, which became spoiled and resulted in six months tor-
ture. And lastly the marriage of his mother, under duress to a promi-
nent minister, to force him to comply with the request to work in the 
communications department rather than continue as a journalist.28 
But most interesting of all is the author’s description of the society in 
which he lives, which echoes the language in Stark’s description of 
the domestic perpetrator of coercive control: 
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… People must not think about the leader and how he 
runs the country; they must simply adore him, want to 
die for him in their adoration of him, Therefore the 
leader creates a roar all around him, forcing people to 
celebrate him, to roar … people are coerced into the 
streets in order to chant … the leader seeking to cove 
himself with a roaring halo….as a means of covering up 
and suppressing any other sound. With this roar, he aims 
to cover up violent crimes he unleashed against his ri-
vals in the underground dungeons of the security appa-
ratus, those places located far out of sight but which 
everyone knows about.29 
 
 The other two examples can be found is the works of two fe-
male journalists in Syria, both now resident in France:  Janine Di 
Giovanni and Samar Yazbek. Notwithstanding the risks associated 
with journalism in a conflict zone anyway, both describe life in Syria 
as one as predicated on fear, dominance and control. Janine Di Gio-
vanni describes instances of psychological pressure, where there is a 
fear of a family member being raped. This concurs with a recognition 
in the statement ahead of the 2014 Global Summit on Sexual Vio-
lence which called for recognition for such acts as psychological tor-
ture, stating, ‘…we must also recognise that men and boys are 
victims of this crime, as are those who are forced to witness or perpe-
trate this violence against their family or community members.’30 In 
Dispatches From Syria: the Morning they Came For Us, Di Giovan-
ni provides a voice for Syrian women in particular. One describes the 
specific tactics of the Shabbiha, or secret police acting for the regime 
(which translates as ghosts).  
 
Their tactics were largely to incite fear within communi-
ties; to enter towns and villages after the government 
troops had been fighting nearby, and spread the word 
that that they would rape the women… daughters, 
mothers, cousin, nieces. It’s a convenient way to ethni-
cally cleanse an entire region. Fear can be generated so 
easily.31 
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In ‘A woman in the Cross Fire: Diaries of the Syrian Revolu-
tion’, Samar Yazbek describes, in similar terms again to Stark’s de-
scription of how a perpetrator creates ‘the injection of fear into 
everyday life’, and how it has become normalised.  She describes 
how “…without realising it people subsist on fear, which has become 
as automatic as breathing.”32 She describes the omnipresence of the 
security forces who are described as “sprouted out of the ground” 
and how the ‘earth split open with [them].’33 Stark also talks about 
surveillance and monitoring as being a key part of the continuum of 
violence and likens it to tactics used to intimidate Prisoners of War or 
hostages, but in Yazbek’s work we can similarly see a comparison to 
her situation as a journalist being controlled by the secret police. In 
the same way, the intention is to ensure omnipresence and enforcing 
behaviours; as Stark describes it, letting the victim know she is being 
watched or overheard, which cause isolation both of the victim and 
by the victim. Yazbek endures cycles of violence, detention, intimi-
dation, threats both physical and sexual, and threats against her 
daughter. She turns to Xanax to cope.  
 
 
Conclusions 
My objective was to demonstrate a need to better understand the im-
pact of coercive control in the international space, not only as a 
weapon or war, but also as a means to govern a nation, or to incite 
violence or behaviours that are desired to further the aims of those in, 
or exercising power over others. If we understand that connection 
between acts of violence associated with the domestic space, and 
how those same behaviours form part of a continuum of violence in 
conflict that is more than the ‘situational violence’ that Johnson de-
scribes.  
 
Syrian writers often talk about the fabric of Syrian society, and 
how that has been destroyed; I do not think that Stark’s offer of ‘sex-
ual terrorism’ as a descriptor for this is the right terminology; but the 
use of the word terrorism does describe the impact of this violence. It 
is intimate; there is a relationship between the perpetrator and the 
victim that is different to that of a perpetrator of random acts of vio-
lence. There is also a continuum, and I would argue a mechanism 
that held the fabric of society together when required, but also when 
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a tipping point is reached, provokes an action and reaction that has 
destroyed a country. In intimate partner violence, the relationship can 
continue for years, until something happens; sadly, in many cases 
resulting in extreme violence and death. Having looked at both ‘situ-
ations’, what differentiates the two is less clear to me at this stage 
than it was when I started.  
 
 However, in discussing the ‘sexual terrorism’ concept, Ann 
Flitcraft offered another insight which I will conclude this paper 
with. I talked about women in conflict living in constant fear; she 
reminded me of the reason behind the formation of the ‘Reclaim the 
Night’ movement in the UK. Liz Kelly visited Leeds at the time 
when the Yorkshire Ripper was committing his crimes against wom-
en in the city. She describes how she ‘sensed an atmosphere of fear 
amongst women…83 percent of women restricted their move-
ments’34. For her, this increased her awareness of how strong the fear 
of attack can be and the enormous effect it has on freedom.’35 The 
Reclaim the Night marches were a response to that loss of freedom, 
and anger at the seemingly slow response of the police, and differen-
tial treatment of the female student victims over the prostitutes. The 
result was a series of coordinated marches across the UK in opposi-
tion to the police advice of the time that women should stay indoors 
and not go out at night unless accompanied by a man. Women took 
to the streets en masse with flaming torches. We see this act of defi-
ance when women are able to leave abusive relationships, or even 
when they are forced to kill their abuser. We also saw it in the defi-
ance and protest marches against the regime in Syria in the spring of 
2011 and the foundation of movements like ‘Syrian Women in Sup-
port of the Uprising’. Time will tell whether Syrian women will be 
able to reclaim their lives, not just the night, and whether a specific 
offence of coercive control will ensure women in the domestic sphere 
can do the same. If they can, then those principles of freedom, digni-
ty and a sense of identity are the cornerstones of a society, including 
post conflict Syria, that must be in place for the future.  
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